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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                              18 Cr. 323 (JSR)
                 V.
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     EZRA CHOWAIKI,
                                              Sentence
                    Defendant.
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 8
                                              New York, N.Y.
                                              September 27, 2018
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                                              12:00 a.m.
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     Before:
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                           HON. JED S. RAKOFF,
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                                              District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
15
      GEOFFREY S. BERMAN
           United States Attorney for the
16
           Southern District of New York
17
     BY: DANIEL M. TRACER
          Assistant United States Attorney
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     PARKER & CARMODY, LLP
          Attorneys for Defendant
19
     BY: DANIEL S. PARKER
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          CHRISTINA S. COOPER
          -and-
21
     GALLET DREYER & BERKEY, LLP
     BY: ROGER L. STAVIS
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23
     Also Present: Elizabeth Massey, Senior Law Clerk
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(Case called)

MR. TRACER: Daniel Tracer, for the government. I'm joined by our office's senior law clerk, Elizabeth Massey.

Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. PARKER: Good afternoon, your Honor. Daniel Parker, appearing on behalf of Mr. Chowaiki, along with Christina Cooper, from my office, and Roger Stavis, who is representing Mr. Chowaiki in related civil proceedings.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

We're here for sentence. The probation office has calculated the total offense level as 24, the criminal history category as I, and therefore, the guideline range, which is not binding on the Court but which the Court must consider, is 51 to 63 months.

I take it the parties are agreed that is the guideline calculation. Yes?

MR. TRACER: We agree, your Honor.

MR. PARKER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good.

The probation office recommends a sentence of 36 months. Defense counsel recommends a sentence of a year and a day, and the government asks for a sentence around the guideline range. As usual, total agreement.

Let me hear first from defense counsel, then from

government counsel, and then from the defendant, if he wishes to be heard.

MR. PARKER: On behalf of Mr. Chowaiki, your Honor, I know, because I know your Honor has read and is very familiar with all of the facts and circumstances of the sentencing submission on behalf of both parties, so I'm going to just highlight what I think are some salient points, which I would urge the Court to consider.

The first thing I would like to just emphasize is that sitting next to me, the defendant in this case, is a very, very good person who made some very serious misjudgments and errors, for which he is truly sorry and has exhibited remorse from the inception of this case.

Your Honor is aware, as you just said, that probation is recommending a sentence less than the guidelines. I would say that this Court has been in the forefront of courts recognizing that guidelines sentences are not necessarily a measure of a person's culpability, and I would say that this Court has been at the forefront of recognizing that not only in this building but perhaps nationwide.

I think that it is important to understand that the loss factor in this case, which has driven the guidelines to these high numbers, is something that is really not indicative of the level of Mr. Chowaiki's criminal conduct.

THE COURT: I agree with that totally in the sense

that I agree with the first part of what you said, which is that the loss guidelines are among the more bizarre features of the sentencing guideline regime. It is amazing to me how much they distort the situation that the Court confronts, not just in this case but in innumerable cases, so you don't need to spend more time about the guidelines. I'll hear from the government, of course, but subject to their changing my mind, the guidelines are, in my view, not very important in this case.

 $\label{eq:what I am concerned about are two things that you $$ $$ \mbox{might want to respond to.}$ 

The first is that some of the effects of this fraud had fairly devastating effects. I'm thinking particularly of one of the victim impact statements that we got. It was from Dr. Bogomila Welsh-Ovcharov, who, in effect, alleges that the fraud, as perpetrated on her, not only caused her tremendous economic harm but emotional harm as well.

The second issue that you might want to address is that one gets the impression from this and other cases, and the government, I think, made reference to this in their papers, that the art markets, so to speak, are very poorly regulated, if at all, which places, perhaps, a greater burden on the Court in terms of general deterrence than it might otherwise be called upon to consider.

I'm happy to hear, of course, everything else you

said. I've read the many letters you submitted. They all attest to the overall good character of the defendant. They are important to the Court, very important to the Court. I always think that when it comes to sentencing, the singlemost important question for the Court is the nature of the human being I have before me, and I think you have shown in those letters that outside these terrible events that led us to today, he has conducted himself with considerable honor. There were even two letters from victims who nevertheless felt that they had to attest to his good character.

All of that I take -- again, subject to hearing from the government -- as well established, but I'm concerned more about the other issues that I just mentioned.

MR. PARKER: Addressing the two issues of your Honor's immediate question, one is the victim impact letter from Ms. Bogomila Welsh-Ovcharov.

THE COURT: There were three impact letters, but this is the one that was most on point.

MR. PARKER: Yes, and as I said in my sentencing submission, that letter is not what I would submit is indicative really of who Mr. Chowaiki is in terms of his entire persona, history and character, and that letter is the one that, like your Honor, affected him the most, for which there's no doubt that he is extraordinarily remorseful and upset.

Fortunately, I believe, and I've conferred with the

government, that of the 23 paintings at issue in this case, 18 are either in the government's possession or control, or certainly they're in the process of securing them.

THE COURT: I assume they're all hanging on the assistant's wall right now.

MR. PARKER: I won't comment, but I've seen

Mr. Tracer's office, and it looks like it's decorated -
THE COURT: More spartan.

MR. PARKER: It looks like it's decorated in a little bit more institutional art.

But I believe that the artwork belonging to this particular victim is artwork that will be ultimately returned to her. While that doesn't excuse his conduct with respect to her, it does provide some means for the Court to say that she is in all likelihood to get that artwork back when this sort of mess is cleared out.

In terms of the Court's second concern about the unregulated artwork in general, I think that, of course, is a very legitimate concern, but at the same time, one, this isn't the case where, as the government cites in its sentencing memo, people engaged in fraudulent art transactions for three, six, etc., from the inception.

So when you're evaluating what is a proportional sentence, which I think both parties agree is important for the Court's consideration, the proportionality of what he did

relative to what people who received a sentence, let's say, from Judge Kaplan of 41 months, where, for nine years, someone sold fake art, that's something that is intended from the beginning, to steal property from people. And that's not what Mr. Chowaiki did in this case.

And nothing I say -- I'm not saying anything that should be viewed as his denying his responsibility for this or in that vein, but there is a difference, at least in my opinion, as to someone who intentionally engages in fraudulent conduct from the inception and does it over and over, and then, when confronted, lies about it with the FBI, etc., as opposed to this person, who ran a legitimate, well-respected business, and for reasons set forth in my memo, engaged in conduct for which he's truly sorry. And then when everything came to a halt, he not only voluntarily tried to offer assistance to the government to help clean up the mess, but he ultimately provided assistance to, for example, another victim in this case by setting forth his art expertise.

And he remains, as the prosecutor knows, because we had telephone calls in which we voluntarily said, We will help you identify, and we did. We offered, and we said, This is where this artwork can be located. This is not a person who did anything other than try to right the wrongs that he regrets.

In terms of what your Honor said about -- I've been

told; I've never been a judge -- that judges view sentencings as one of the most challenging and difficult things that they have to do.

With that in mind, your Honor has said that you view the person as the critical factor. And emphasizing the history and character of this human being, I think that I've outlined in my sentencing submissions not only who he was, not only all the letters about what an extraordinary person he was, the fact that there is a courtroom filled with people here today demonstrating their commitment and support of him, to emphasize to your Honor, in a way saying, Please exercise your judgment in a reasonable way, recognizing that he's going to be punished. But it's not just his extraordinary character and the support of loved ones, but it's the psychological issues that affected his judgment, which were documented, which make sense in explaining his behavior here and, again, followed by his postarrest conduct, which I would submit is mitigation.

In terms of the proportionality that I've addressed, I think it was Judge Learned Hand who may have expressed the importance of a judge exercising sentences that are proportional and relevant in evaluating a person's criminal culpability.

THE COURT: I think we can take it as a given if there is anything worth quoting ever said, it was said by Learned Hand.

MR. PARKER: I think that's right.

There are defense attorneys who submit sentencing submissions asking for what they think, what they really believe is not a reasonable sentence but on the low end, knowing the government is going to come in, pursuant to policy, and recommend guidelines or on or about guidelines, and I'm hoping that the Court will --

THE COURT: Mr. Parker, it's been my great pleasure to have you before me many times, and one of the reasons is your high credibility. I was very pleased to see that you were not making a pitch for no jail time, which would have been, I think, unconvincing to the Court, so I appreciate where you're going.

MR. PARKER: I always appreciate your Honor's kind words, but what I would say is that the government asked the Court to impose a substantial period of incarceration.

For this man, who's led this life, which brought him to this tragic day in his life, any period, a period of a year incarceration is a substantial sentence for him, and it would represent a terrible, terrible thing that he would have to go through, and he understands that.

At the same time, it would serve the general and the specific deterrence that this Court is concerned about. I think all the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553 include not only the impact on the individual victims in this case but also

the broader schemes of punishment and what it's designed to achieve, and it is for those reasons that I'm asking your Honor to impose a sentence of a year and a day. We submit that it is reasonable. It is not more than necessary. It is completely appropriate. It is called for based on his acts, his history, his character and what transpired in this case.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Let me hear from the government.

MR. TRACER: Sure. Thank you.

Good afternoon, your Honor.

I wanted to make three points. I think two of them relate to the points I think your Honor rightly focused on in this case. One is the harm to the individual art owners that were defrauded.

Your Honor has seen the victim impact statements, particularly the one of Dr. Welsh-Ovcharov and the impact that this had on her. I think what's significant here is that people like Dr. Welsh-Ovcharov went to Mr. Chowaiki because he held himself out as an expert in the field, as someone who ran a reputable gallery, and it's a significant part of the crime that was committed here.

One of the reasons I wanted to hand up in advance the restitution order, which I'll have some additional things to say about after to your Honor, is just so your Honor can see

sort of our most up-to-date thinking on the loss amount and the victims here. It's a loss in excess of \$10 million, notwithstanding, I think, the point that defense counsel has rightly made, that works of art are particularly subject to market differences from time to time, so the number is not necessarily always an accurate number, but it's about two dozen paintings, and it is certainly millions and millions of dollars of artwork taken from multiple —

THE COURT: Yes. There's no doubt that this was a substantial crime when viewed financially.

My problem with the guidelines is the gross weight, overweight that they place on loss. In a typical white collar case, the loss amount is responsible for 70 percent of the calculation of the offense level, and that seems to me totally oblivious to the many other factors that any reasonable court should take into account in this very sensitive area of sentencing. But I don't suggest for a moment, and I don't think defense counsel suggests for a moment, that this wasn't a substantial fraud, on any possible view of it. Whether it was 9 million, 12 million, whatever, it was a lot of money, a lot of fraud and involving a long period of time.

MR. TRACER: We understand that, your Honor, and I think that your Honor has certainly been very public about that opinion.

To that point, I should say that the government

doesn't think that a sentence — and I say approximately the guideline range here. It is not because it is the guidelines range here. It's because of the other factors, and this is a good segue to the other points about, I think, the general market issues here as well as what we flagged for your Honor as some data points, understanding that no comparison is perfect, and I'll get to those in a minute.

In terms of the market, I think, to the second point your Honor made, the art market is a particularly vulnerable market. And in particular in this case, and we quoted some of the language in our brief -- I don't mean to compare the defendant to another defendant that your Honor sentenced, Marc Dreier, but I do think some of the sentiments that your Honor expressed in some of the opinions dealing with the forfeiture aspect of that case are apt in this circumstance.

We have a case where, because of the hard work of the FBI, most of the paintings were recovered in this case, and they are now -- just for your Honor, they are not in my office. They are at a storage gallery called Day & Meyer on the Upper East Side, which is a reputable art institution, and we do have, therefore, most of those paintings.

As it turns out, we don't have the one that is the subject of Dr. Welsh-Ovcharov's claim, but nevertheless, we do have most of them. But the process of getting them back to their owners will not be simple. As your Honor has seen on the

docket, there are multiple claims to almost every painting, and that's something that I'm sure we will take up in due course with the Court, but it's one of the effects of fraud and, again, ought to be taken into account here.

The third points I'll make, unless your Honor has any questions, is just some of the comparison points we felt were appropriate for your Honor. We looked at some of the art fraud cases that have been brought and sentenced in this district over the last few years.

In the John Re case, Judge Castel sentenced him to 60 months in prison. Granted, the scheme lasted over a longer period of time; it was a nine-year scheme involving over \$2 million of loss, so the loss amount there is less, whereas it's more here.

I certainly agree with Mr. Parker that it is a different crime selling fake art versus defrauding people of their real art. In terms of which one's worse, it's hard to say, and it depends on the circumstances, but I do think it is a sort of relevant point of comparison in a case like this.

Likewise, Judge Kaplan sentenced a defendant named Spoutz to 41 months in prison, also for selling fake art, so in that sense different than this case, but in a scheme that involved about 1.5 million in loss. And so when you see numbers like those, I think, and our guideline range here being in the 50- to 60-month range, it appears as if that sentence is

within the sort of norm for sentences imposed on relatively comparable defendants within this district, under similar circumstances.

THE COURT: The difficulty I always have with those kinds of comparisons hearkens back to the point I made to defense counsel.

There is, in this Court's view, a huge difference between someone who is a basically good person, conducts his life in an honorable fashion and even laudable fashion, and nevertheless, for economic-pressure reasons or otherwise, is led into very serious criminal activity versus someone who is heedless of other people, who spends his life as a living fraud. I hate to say it, but that was true of Marc Dreier, and it was one of the reasons I imposed such a high sentence in that case.

To me, it still comes back down -- it's not the only factor, of course; I have to consider all the factors under Section 3553(a), and they're all important -- but to me, the factor that weighs very heavily is the nature of the human being before me.

The defense suggestion is that unlike, perhaps, some of the people you're referring to in those other cases, though I don't know that much about the nature of the human beings there, here we have an essentially good man who did a very bad thing.

Do you disagree with that?

MR. TRACER: We don't, your Honor. We don't dispute that the factual circumstances — and I think it is significant, I will say that his acceptance of responsibility was very quick and fulsome in this case. I do not dispute that.

THE COURT: OK. Anything else you wanted to tell me?

MR. TRACER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. PARKER: Before you hear from Mr. Chowaiki, may I very briefly respond?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PARKER: And I appreciate the government's acknowledgement that Mr. Chowaiki accepted responsibility quickly, because he did, and the parties knew that.

I would just remind the Court, in my reply memorandum, I set forth the factors of the relative culpability of the individuals who the government references, specifically, Mr. Spoutz, who was sentenced by Judge Kaplan, who did engage in this for, intentionally committed fraud for a long period of time and then lied to the FBI, etc., as well as Mr. Re, who was sentenced by Judge Castel, who had a lengthy criminal history, and apart from everything else, basically, even at sentencing, denied his acceptance of responsibility and sort of, what I submit, was dishonest with the Court representing where the

proceeds of that had gone to.

In terms of evaluating the relative culpability of Mr. Chowaiki, that's just something I want to remind your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Let me hear from the defendant if he wishes to be heard.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor.

I'm a little nervous.

Over the last year, I've tried very hard to figure out how it is that I ended up doing what I did. For so long, I built a business based on integrity, scholarship and professionalism. Lying and scheming were antithetical to my company. And for many years, even through difficult circumstances, I adhered to those core values.

This is why it's so hard for me and for the people that know me to understand why I allowed myself to do something so terrible. Why did I let my brain take a wrong turn? Why did I allow myself to make the biggest mistake of my life?

I want to be clear. What I did -- all my actions -- were wrong. I'm not someone without morals. I know right from wrong. So why did I do it all?

The short answer, which is by no means an excuse, is I got desperate. My company had suffered such bad hits, not just in recent years but for years prior. I trusted people that I

should not have trusted, but just as bad, I trusted my own flawed instincts. In times I should have been cautious, I went ahead with decisions that were, in hindsight, foolish and which made my company lose money. Some of these losses were within my control and some were not, but what was absolutely in my control was how I tried to rectify these losses. I did that by lying and defrauding people, and the most abhorrent part of it for me is that some of these people were my friends and people who trusted me.

I still do not understand how I could do such a thing, but I did. And even if mental health issues are involved, I do not want to hide behind any of that. I take full ownership of my actions.

I will say that I never meant to hurt anyone. In fact, I was foolishly hoping that I could move things around to keep my company afloat long enough for me to conclude a large enough deal or two to bail me out. I was reckless with other people's money and property, and I deluded myself into thinking that I could keep everyone in the dark until that elusive big score. I'd had big successes before, and I hoped to be able to reimburse those who I had taken from. Of course, this is wrong, not just because those big deals cannot be counted on, but because I was using someone else's money and property, and trust, trust that took me years to build.

I cannot be more sorry. Many people felt betrayed by

me, and I truly feel I did betray them. Many people who vouched for me or introduced me to others, for example, may not have suffered direct losses but were nevertheless adversely affected by my actions towards the people to whom they recommended me. And they are victims too.

My children have been affected. They have had to deal with humiliation and shame; my ex-wife too, and my friends, my brothers, my mom. Just considering this is almost too much to bear.

To all those people -- my victims -- both direct and indirect, I would like to apologize. To my victims, I am so, so sorry for how I lied and misled you. I am so sorry for mistreating you like this. To my indirect victims, I'm sorry I misused your trust in me.

Over the last year, not only have I been shamed and shunned and excommunicated, I've lost my career and livelihood. I've had to rely on friends who have graciously housed me and supported me, something which has made me grateful and ashamed. And probably most tragically, I have ruined my relationship with my children. I hope in time that they, like others, will be able to forgive me and I can repair relationships that I've so badly damaged.

I would have ended my remarks here, but my friends have advised me to say some things to hopefully illustrate for you who I am. I must say I'm exceedingly uncomfortable

pointing out these qualities, especially because I do not feel much pride anymore.

I'm a charitable person. I have given all my life, not just money but those more elusive assets, time and effort.

I, along with my ex-wife and kids, for many years have welcomed inner city kids to live with us months at a time. During all that time, I -- we -- have remained involved in their lives.

I have actively participated in charitable organizations like Ronald McDonald House, the Special Olympics and, most recently, God's Love We Deliver, where I have volunteered throughout the last year. I truly hate that I have to enumerate these activities in an effort to seek leniency. I never did them for points or recognition. In fact, I hardly told anyone about them. I mention these things because I want you to know who I am, a good person who did terrible things, for which I cannot be more sorry.

I hope to be able to pay back the people who I have harmed, not just financially but emotionally. I intend on spending the rest of my life paying them back and to rebuild my reputation which I worked so hard to build. I'm gratified that all -- or most -- of the works will be returned to their rightful owners. I am thankful that the FBI will do what I could not do.

People say that all this will be over one day. I truly hope so, because right now, I cannot imagine it ever

will.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to address you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

I think the Court has already identified the factors that I think are particularly prominent in this case.

On the one hand, this was a substantial fraud, carried out intentionally, knowingly, willfully over a prolonged period of time. On the other hand, everything else in the defendant's character is positive. The statement he just made confirms in the Court's own mind the good qualities that he exhibited over a great deal of his life.

Always the hardest question, or among the hardest questions, for any court in imposing sentence is the question of general deterrence. Sociologists have attempted to study this, without, frankly, much success. We know the extremes. We know that life imprisonment has a greater deterrent effect than three months of imprisonment, but we don't know much beyond that, from a scientific or sociological standpoint.

There is some data that suggests that with respect to white collar crimes, an absence of any imprisonment has a negative effect in terms of general deterrence, that it doesn't achieve general deterrence, but that modest imprisonment has a greater impact in this area than it does in some other areas of criminality. But all of this is soft and is not well

established.

Sometimes general deterrence, frankly, can be just an excuse for a court to say that they really want to impose a heavy sentence in order to "send a message." I'm not suggesting that that is the intent of those judges who say that, but I am suggesting that it does not grapple with the moral question of what is sufficient to send a message, but no more than necessary, in terms of punishing the human being in front of the court.

Counsel is quite right. All judges find sentencing to be extremely difficult, and not just because of the humility with which any human being should approach imposing anything as harsh as imprisonment on any other human being but also because of the difficulties in finding what is the right sentence in the Court's view. I don't want to spend too much time on the sentencing guidelines, because that's not the heart of this sentence in any respect.

The guidelines, in this Court's view, are a foolish attempt to relieve judges of that difficult burden they face through a totally artificial and often irrational numbers game, and in my view, it's just an evasion of judicial responsibility.

One factor that does loom importantly for the Court in this case is the somewhat unregulated -- "somewhat" may be the wrong adjective -- the seemingly unregulated nature of the art

market.

Here, we have something that, by its very nature, calls for expertise and knowledge and can easily be the subject of fraud, and yet, it seems to operate without any meaningful constraints except those imposed by the character of the persons involved in it, so I think that does weigh modestly in favor of a higher sentence. But on the other hand, the very cases that the government cites, as further elucidated by defense counsel, will illustrate how different those cases are from this case.

This is not a case of the kind of forged art, for example, or a total sham entity set up for the purpose of committing financial fraud, or the like. I'm going on at such length because I find this a particularly difficult sentence, but in the end, I think that Congress was very wise when it instructed the courts to sentence a defendant for the term of imprisonment sufficient to carry out the various functions of sentencing, as set forth in Section 3553, but no more than necessary for that.

This is the Occam's razor of sentencing, and it makes a lot of sense to me, so while I worry a little bit that this sentence may be, in this Court's view, a little too lenient, I'm going to impose an 18-month sentence.

The sentence of the Court is that the defendant is sentenced to 18 months in prison to be followed by three years

of supervised release under terms I'll get to in a moment.

No fine will be imposed because there will be a very substantial restitution, which we'll talk about in a moment.

There is, however, a mandatory \$100 assessment that also must be paid.

The terms of supervised release are, first, the mandatory conditions that the defendant must not commit any other federal, state or local crime;

That the defendant must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

The drug-testing condition, however, will be suspended based on the Court's determination that the defendant faces a low risk of future substance abuse.

However, the further mandatory condition, that the defendant cooperate in the collection of DNA, will be imposed.

There will also be imposed the standard conditions of supervision, 1 through 13. They appear on the face of the judgment and will be gone over with the defendant by the probation officer when the defendant reports to begin his period of supervised release.

And then there are the special conditions, but before we turn to the special conditions, I have the proposed order of restitution in the amount of \$12,899,980.

Is that order a consent order? Do both sides agree to that or not?

MR. TRACER: I believe the defense has agreed to that.

MR. PARKER: We have, but we have also, I think, a joint application with respect to the order of restitution, and so I'll let Mr. Tracer make that application.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. TRACER: Sure.

Your Honor, we do agree with it. Your Honor has the ability to delay restitution up to 90 days, and perhaps more, if the defendant agrees.

This restitution order has some unique provisions in it, and in particular, this provision about if the work goes back to the particular victim, as spelled out in paragraph 1, the restitution — essentially the defendant gets credited for that. The forfeiture order in this case works similarly.

Because we do think there is some work to do in terms of sorting out the ownership of the paintings, we would propose that the Court hold off on entering this order, because those, as I'll get to in a moment, those sort of proceedings, the ancillary proceedings may result in, by settlement, we think, many of the paintings —

THE COURT:

That's fine. Forgive me for interrupting. I'm happy to do that for the 90 days. I'm not happy to do it for more than that, so don't come back and ask for more. Whatever you can do in 90 days, fine. Otherwise, work it into the order, as

you already have, that there are future credits that may be applied, but I don't want to leave this hanging beyond 90 days.

MR. TRACER: Thank you.

THE COURT: The special conditions of supervised release are, first, that the defendant must provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information;

Second, that he must not incur any new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer unless he is in compliance with the installment payment schedule. Although we don't have the amount yet, the installment payment schedule will be 15 percent of the defendant's gross monthly income beginning with the second month of supervised release.

Finally, the last special condition is that the defendant must report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours of his release from prison, and he will be supervised by the district of his residence.

Now, before I advise the defendant of his right of appeal, we need to know about surrender date and also anything else counsel wants to raise.

Anything else from the government?

MR. TRACER: I would like, your Honor -- I think this is the right time to do it -- to raise the issue of sort of sorting out these additional claims. I can do that now or we

can wait until after.

THE COURT: No. I mean, I think we need to set up hearings, but don't you need to have the relevant people present? Why don't you just do that by giving me a phone call with each of them, and we'll individually set up those hearings.

MR. TRACER: We can do that, your Honor.

If I can give a little context, there are 21 parties that are parties to this, and I have spoken to the trustee, who is here today and has been helpful in this process. He's actively pursuing settlements with a lot of them, and so one of the things — and in addition, I should add, I think, before a hearing is held, there would be an opportunity to move to dismiss some of the petitions, which I think we would do if some of the cases don't settle.

THE COURT: Again, forgive me for interrupting, but I want to move this along.

I have no problem waiting. I would say the most I'd be willing to wait is two months.

MR. TRACER: OK.

THE COURT: If he can settle a lot of them before then, terrific. Great. After two months, with respect to any open matters, whether it's a matter of moving to dismiss or a matter of having an evidentiary hearing, or whatever, you will need to convene with the Court a conference call with each of

the relevant people for each of those situations on the phone.

And we'll set dates for the proceedings.

MR. TRACER: OK. That sounds -- thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything from the defense?

MR. PARKER: I believe the government does not object to a self-surrender on this case, so I would just ask the Court to set a date for it.

THE COURT: Yes, let's do that now.

MR. PARKER: I would also ask that your Honor adopt our request that you recommend, to the extent eligible, that he be designated to the satellite camp at FCI Otisville.

THE COURT: Yes, I will certainly recommend that. As I'm sure you've told your client, I have no power to order it, but I can recommend it, and I will.

MR. PARKER: I've told my client that most courts have no powers but that this Court has unique powers.

THE COURT: Right. You'd better talk to my wife. She will disillusion you.

Let's get the surrender date.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thursday, November 8, by 2 p.m.

MR. PARKER: Would the Court consider a longer date?

He's not a flight risk. He's been completely compliant with

his pretrial services officer.

THE COURT: I would consider a later date in November.

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I wouldn't consider beyond November.
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               MR. PARKER: Does November have 31 days, your Honor?
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               THE COURT: It only has 30.
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               MR. PARKER: Then that would be the request.
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               THE COURT: Friday, November 30, at 2 p.m.
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               MR. PARKER: In all candor, actually, I'm not sure he
 7
     will be designated by then. It takes time.
               THE COURT: We factored that into the date we gave,
8
9
      but in our experience, they're able to do it in approximately
10
      45 days.
11
               MR. PARKER: November 30 at 2; is that what your Honor
12
      said?
13
               THE COURT: Yes. Obviously, if he hasn't been
14
     designated, we'll extend it accordingly.
15
               Mr. Chowaiki, you have the right to appeal this
      conviction.
16
17
               Do you understand that?
18
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
               THE COURT: This sentence, I should say. And if you
19
20
      don't have funds to retain counsel for the appeal, the Court
21
      will appoint one for you free of charge.
22
               Do you understand that?
23
               THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor.
24
               THE COURT: Very good.
25
               (Adjourned)
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